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annuitization decisions. Our results show that annuities become less attractive to people facing uncertain
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those in poor health, as compared to persons in good health.
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Chapter 10
The Impact of Health Status and
Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenditures
on Annuity Valuation
Cassio M. Turra and Olivia S. Mitchell

The primary purpose of annuities is to protect people against the risk of
outliving their financial resources in old age. Prior analysts have reported
that annuities should be of substantial value to risk-averse people who
face an uncertain date of death (Yaari 1965), yet relatively few people
seem to purchase annuities at the point of retirement (Johnson, Burman,
and Kobes 2004). A growing body of research has explored factors that
may explain this puzzle, including retirees’ desire to leave bequests, the
existence of adverse selection in the annuity market, the overannuitization
of retirement wealth, and the need for liquidity. Further, researchers have
also found that people use private information about their survival chances
to make the decision of purchasing an annuity, and those who anticipate
living longer are more likely to buy an annuity (Petrova 2004). In any event,
there is still little understanding of how private information regarding own
health status may be related to the demand for annuities. Some researchers
have tried to address this gap in knowledge (Sinclair and Smetters 2004),
but empirical investigations of this kind have been hampered by the multidimensional aspect of health, and the absence of long-term nationally
representative panel data on health at older ages.
In this chapter, we contribute to the literature on health status and
annuity valuation by describing how differences in retirees’ health status
might influence the decision to purchase a life annuity. To do this, we use
dynamic discrete choice estimation in the context of an economic model
of behavior. We propose two approaches to incorporate the effect of health
differentials on annuitization valuation. One incorporates the effect of
health via differences in survival throughout the life cycle. Yet this approach
does not consider precautionary savings that might be motivated by uncertain out-of-pocket medical expenses. Accordingly, our second model posits
that retirees in different health states consider the effects of both uncertain
out-of-pocket medical expenses and uncertain survival, when making their
annuitization choice. We compare the optimal level of annuitization and
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the insurance value of a life annuity for people in different health states at
the point of annuity purchase.
Compared to prior studies, our work is distinguished by its effort to
measure the impact of anticipated poor health on annuity valuation. This is
important in the retirement context since there is substantial risk of becoming disabled after age 65. For instance, the 70-year old must anticipate
that he may have severe functional limitations for about one-quarter of his
remaining lifetime, and 70 percent of his remaining years will, on average,
be spent with at least some functional difficulty (Crimmins, Hayward, and
Saito 1994). The greater prevalence of disability among the elderly also
brings with it much higher health spending: people with severe functioning
limitations have annual Medicare costs $7,000 higher than nondisabled
persons (Cutler and Meara 2001). Our study is therefore informative about
the potential for development of an impaired annuity market that would
provide higher payouts for consumers in poor health.
Understanding how health status affects annuity markets is also important for policy analysts, in particular those who propose personal Social
Security retirement accounts (c.f. Cogan and Mitchell 2003). Recent
research has suggested that mandating annuitization for all participants
in a personal accounts scheme would imply transfers from high-mortality
risk groups to low-mortality risk groups (c.f. Brown 2003). Health and
mortality are also strongly associated, particularly among the elderly (Hurd,
McFadden, and Merrill 2001). Consequently, understanding how health
influences the insurance value of annuities may help insurers fashion annuity offerings under Social Security reform plans, so as to make a larger
proportion of the participants better off.

The Context
Defined contribution (DC) pension plans now cover over 70 percent of
those workers with a pension [United States Department of Labor (U.S.
DOL 2004)]. As more employees reach retirement with large DC pension
accruals, they are increasingly allowed to receive their savings as a lump
sum, rather than annuitizing the saving as under conventional defined
benefit (DB) plan. The concern is that, by taking their accumulated DC
assets in a lump sum, participants may exhaust their pension assets before
dying (Mitchell, Gordon, and Twinney 1997).
One way to protect against such longevity risk is to purchase a life annuity.
A long economic literature has shown that risk-averse individuals with no
bequest motives should strongly favor converting all their DC pension
assets to private annuities. For instance, Mitchell et al. (1999) show that
age-65 retirees with access to an actuarially fair annuity market would be
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predicted to fully annuitize at age 65. Further, that study estimated that
people lacking access to an annuity market would be willing to forgo
between 30 and 40 percent of their wealth at age 65, in order to purchase actuarially fair annuities. Brown (2003), using the same approach,
shows how cross-group mortality differentials can influence life-annuity
insurance values. He finds that annuities provide considerable longevity
insurance to all groups, regardless of their race, ethnic group, or educational attainment, and even when annuity premiums are actuarially unfair,
those facing high mortality (e.g., blacks with low education) would still
be predicted to value a life annuity. These studies confirm the pioneering theoretical work of Yaari (1965) who showed that people lacking a
bequest motive and facing an uncertain date of death would choose to fully
annuitize.1
Overall, then, the theoretical literature suggests that that there should
be substantial growth in the demand for life annuities, as more workers
retire with large investments in DC plans. Yet this has not been the case to
date. Thus Johnson, Burman, and Kobes (2004) used 10 years of data from
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)2 to evaluate how persons aged
55+ disposed of their DC and Individual Retirement Account (IRA) funds.
That study reports that only 4 percent of workers with DC plans annuitized
their assets when they retired, and only 13 percent of those who took
their accumulations from IRAs converted the resources to private annuities.
Further, the market for individual life annuity in the USA remains small,
amounting to less than 10 percent of the size of the life-insurance market
(in 1999, Brown et al. 2001).
Several hypotheses have been offered to explain the low demand for private annuities, though considerable uncertainty about this puzzle remains.
Some attribute the problem to adverse selection in annuity markets: for
instance, only people with very low mortality might tend to purchase
annuities, increasing the premium cost for people with average mortality prospects (e.g., Mitchell and McCarthy 2002). Nevertheless, although
adverse selection does generate low rates of return in annuity contracts for
persons of average mortality, annuity pricing seems to have little empirical
impact on how consumers value life annuities (Brown 2003). Another
explanation offered is that the elderly are overannuitized in the form of
Social Security, and thus they may not need to purchase additional annuitization to insure against longevity risk. Empirical studies, however, tend
to suggest that the elderly would be better off by purchasing additional
private annuity contracts (Brown 2001a; Brown and Warshawsky 2001).
Recently, Petrova (2003) uses the HRS to ask whether perceived mortality
influences the desire to purchase a life annuity; this work confirms that
private information on longevity has a strong influence on the decision to
purchase a life annuity.
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Information on health status is a key component of private information
on longevity, and therefore is a determinant of subjective survival probabilities (Hurd, McFadden, and Merril 2001). Earlier studies have investigated
how uncertain health and, therefore, uncertain medical expenses affect
consumption and saving decisions at older ages (e.g., Hubbard, Skinner,
and Zeldes 1995; Davis 1998; Palumbo 1999). One study, in particular,
predicts that health shocks can reduce the value of a life annuity for riskaverse individuals (Sinclair and Smetters 2004). In what follows, we offer
new empirical evidence of the effect of health status on annuity decisionmaking. We find that an economic model which ignores anticipated health
problems tends to overestimate both the level of desired annuitization and
the insurance value of the life annuity. Our results suggest that retirees who
face uncertain health would prefer to partially annuitize and maintain some
assets in liquid form, so they can buffer the negative effect of unexpected
out-of-pocket medical expenses on future consumption.

Valuing Life Annuities
In this section, we first lay out the general multiperiod model of annuity
purchase with uncertain survival, and we then extend the approach to
incorporate uncertain out-of-pocket medical expenses as well as uncertain
survival. Next, we discuss parameterization of the models as well as data
sources used to evaluate key outcomes.

Model 1: A Yaari-Type Model
We begin by extending Yaari’s classical life-cycle approach with uncertain
lifetimes (1965), as further developed by Brown (2003, 2001b) and Mitchell
et al. (1999). To do so, we posit that, at retirement at, say, age 65, the
individual decides how much of his starting wealth should be annuitized.
This is a maximization problem: that is, given current and future conditions
(e.g., interest rate and mortality distributions), the consumer maximizes
the value function by selecting the amount of annuity which provides the
largest discounted sum of expected future utility. The model posits that
consumers are rational and understand the consequences of their choices
for future consumption, even though the exact outcomes are probabilistic.
That is, while one’s date of death is uncertain, a forward-looking retiree
can evaluate his mortality distribution based on his health status at the age
of annuity purchase.
The consumer’s problem is solved using backward recursion; first the
terminal period problem is solved, and then we work backward to find the
value function at age 65. In the terminal period, t = 95, the future value
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function is equal to 0 since death is certain by the next period (t + 1).3
As in Brown (2001b), and assuming no bequest motive, the retiree would
maximize utility while consuming all remaining wealth, Wt ; the period t
single immediate life annuity, At ; and preexisting real annuity (e.g., social
security benefits) St :
Vt (c t ) = max[u(c t )],

(10-1)

subject to the following constraints:
s.t. W0 given
Wt ≥ 0 ∀t
Wt+1 = (Wt − C t + St + At )(1 + r )

(10-2)

where r is the interest rate. Knowing the optimal consumption decision
in period t allows one to find the optimal consumption decision that
maximizes the value function in period t − 1. The same logic is used subsequently in each previous period to choose the consumption that maximizes
the Bellman equation:
Vt−1 = u(c t−1 ) + ‚ 1 pt−1 [Vt (c t )]

(10-3)

where ‚ is the discount factor, and 1 pt−1 is the probability of surviving from
period t − 1 to t for an individual of health status j at the age at annuity
purchase. We approximate optimal consumption paths by making wealth
discrete and testing a large number of values between arbitrary minimum
and maximum values that are consistent with the initial conditions of the
model.
We seek to learn both the optimal level of annuitization at age 65 and
the value of a life annuity in the life-cycle model. Following Mitchell et al.
(1999), we perform a counterfactual exercise with two scenarios. First, we
estimate the value function assuming people have full access to the annuity
market; in other words, we choose the optimal level of annuitization that
maximizes the value function, ranging from 0 to full annuitization. Next, we
estimate the value function in an alternative scenario where people have no
access at all to the annuity market, and we ask how much additional starting
wealth (W0 ) they would have to receive to make them as well off, as in the
first scenario with the annuitization option. The insurance value of a life
annuity is computed by comparing the two scenarios and computing the
Annuity Equivalent Wealth measure (AEW), which indicates how much W0
in the second scenario needs to be increased to produce the same value
function in both scenarios.
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Model 2: Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses
The second model, we assess, takes into account that uncertainty regarding
medical expenses may offer a reason for a retiree to maintain additional
wealth instead of annuitizing all his assets. Here, the retiree is presumed to
consider the effects of both uncertain future medical expenses and uncertain survival when choosing an optimal consumption path. Specifically,
at the age of annuity purchase, we posit that he has private information
regarding his future health status. He uses this information to evaluate the
distribution of future health transitions, although his exact future health
outcomes remain probabilistic. Each period (year) from age 65–95 or
death, the individual learns whether he will incur out-of-pocket medical
expenses. The probability of incurring out-of-pocket medical expenses is
posited to be a function of the retiree’s health status, age, and sex. The
model has the intuitive implication that people cannot precisely predict
their future medical expenses, but they know their out-of-pocket medical
expenses at each age and can use that information when deciding about
optimal future consumption.
The individual’s problem in each period now has several possible outcomes. The expected value function is calculated by considering all possible
combinations of health status and out-of-pocket medical expenses. The
individual is posited to solve for consumption which maximizes utility for
each possible path. At each period, the value function is the weighted sum
of all solutions found, where the weights are the probabilities for each
possible combination of health status and medical expenses:
Vt−1 (c t−1 , h t−1 , Mt−1 ) =

k


g y ,t−1 max[u(c t−1 , h t−1 , Mt−1 )

y =1

+ ‚ 1 pt−1 Vt (c t , h t , Mt )]

(10-4)

subject to the constraints:
s.t. W0 given
Wt−1 ≥ 0 ∀t
Wt = (Wt−1 − C t−1 − Mt−1 + St−1 + At−1 )(1 + r ),

if Mt−1 > 0

(10-5)

where h t−1 is health status at t−1, Mt−1 is period t − 1 out-of-pocket medical
expenses, and g t−1 denotes the probabilities for the k possible combinations of health status and medical expenses. Following earlier studies
(e.g., Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995; Palumbo 1999), we assume
medical expenses are not a consumption good and that individuals cannot
borrow against the future. Therefore, a retiree who incurs out-of-pocket
medical expenses is constrained to consume only the resources that remain
after paying for medical care in each period. We also use the simplifying
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assumption that medical expenses in each period are not correlated with
health status and mortality in the next period.4
The solution approach first involves choosing the optimal solution for
the terminal period, t = 95, and then we continue recursively to find the
value function at the age 65. In a fashion identical to that described above,
the optimal consumption path is calculated at all values of annuitization
and we choose the one that gives the largest discounted sum of expected
future utility. We then compute AEW in order to estimate the insurance
value of a life annuity in the context of uncertain out-of-pocket medical
expenses. Results for both models are compared.

Model Parameterization
To implement the model, we adopt the popular isoelastic CRRA utility
function of the form:
U (c ) =

C 1−„ − 1
,
1−„

(10-6)

where „ is the coefficient of risk aversion (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes
1995; Brown 2001b;). Since the third derivative of this function is positive,
it implicitly allows for precautionary saving that arise from having uncertain out-of-pocket medical expenses in our second model (Deaton 1992).
Consistent with earlier studies (e.g., Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995),
we assume a value for „ of three in our main analysis, and we also present
sensitivity analyses using alternative values for „ of one and five.5 Further,
we assume a value of 3 percent for the rate of time preference, ‚, and a real
3 percent rate of interest per year, consistent with earlier studies (Mitchell
et al. 1999; Brown 2001b; Petrova 2003).
We must also specify the probabilities of dying at each age, conditional
on the health status at the age of annuity purchase (assumed to be 65).
For example, suppose we are solving the models for an individual in good
health at age 65. We need to know his age-specific probabilities of dying at
ages 65–95, given he was in good health 1–30 years previously. The ideal
data-set to estimate these would offer as many years of observation as the
life spans modeled. Unfortunately, no nationally representative panel data
on long-term health and mortality have been collected. Consequently, we
instead use a multistate model (Schoen and Land 1979; Palloni 2001) to
mimic the dependence of mortality on initial health states. This allows
us to follow a hypothetical cohort from age 65 onward, and to calculate
the probabilities of dying at each age, assuming persons at age 65 were in
a specific state of health j . Each age-specific probability of dying is then
posited to reflect health status as of the entry age of 65.
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The use of a multistate model requires the estimation of forces of decrement between states of health. We use the HRS from 1993 to 2000 to
estimate these decrements, since that survey reports mortality and health
changes every two years stayed in the same state of health for up to five
years. Using cohort data is an improvement, compared to cross-sectional
forms of the multistate model, since we can reasonably approximate some
of the effects of duration on the forces of transition (Schoen 1988). The
duration-specific probabilities are specified as a multinomial logit model of
the following form:

ln

Au: Please
provide the
expanded
forms of
‘IADL’.

pj
pJ


Age

= · j + ‚ j x1 + ‚hj x2 + ‚hj x3

j = 1, . . . , J − 1,

(10-7)

where p j is probability that an event j (health transition or death) occurs;
p J is the probability that a baseline event occurs; and xi are indicators of
the individual’s health status in earlier waves.
As noted by many analysts, health is a multidimensional concept that
can be measured in many different ways. Our previous study evaluated predictors of old-age mortality among several self-reported health indicators
measured at the point of retirement (Turra 2004), and we concluded that
functional status, smoking, and self-assessed health are good predictors of
death patterns over the age of 70+. Accordingly, for the present analysis, we
derive results using three states of health based on functional status data:
no functioning problems, IADL limitations,6 and activities of daily living
(ADL) limitations.7
Table 10-1 summarizes estimates calculated from the mortality model
described above in the HRS data, where we show life expectancy at age
65 for both men and women, conditional on health status at age 65.
Not surprisingly, age-65 health differences have important implications for
differences in life expectancy. For example, women with no functional
limitations as of retirement age can expect to live 6.71 more years at age
65 than can women with ADL limitations. Among men, the difference of
5.7 years is smaller but still substantial.
Table 10-1 Life Expectancy at Age 65, HRS
(1993–2000)

No functioning problems
IADL limitations
ADL limitations

Women

Men

21.04
18.89
14.33

16.78
14.20
11.06

Source: Author’s calculations as described in the text.
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Assuming no loading and no taxes, the expected present value of the
payment stream from a single immediate life annuity is given by Brown
(2001b) as:
W0 × ·
t

(1 − q j )

At =
35

j =1

,

(10-8)

j =1
j


(1 + r k )(1 + k )

k=1

where q j is the age-specific probability of dying, r k is the real interest rate,
and k is the inflation rate. The proportion of starting wealth (W0 ) held in
single immediate life annuity, ·, indicates the optimal level of annuitization
and is determined by the model.
To investigate the effects of adverse selection in the annuity market, we
calculate optimal annuitization patterns under two approaches to annuity
pricing. A first set of estimates assumes that retirees have access to actuarially fairly priced annuities8 : in this case, we use the mortality distributions
discussed above to calculate single immediate life-annuity payments for
someone in each health status. A second set of estimates assumes that
all purchasers pay uniform prices; in this case, we use the same mortality
distribution for everyone to calculate the annuity payments irrespective of
health status. The second scenario uses the annuitant life table from the
Society of Actuaries (SOA 1999).
Table 10-2 presents money’s worth values, or estimated expected discounted values of annuity payments per premium dollar. These values
assume that all purchases pay uniform pricing, and they indicate how
annuity payouts vary across people in different health states. The findings
show that the value-per-premium dollar is always below one, regardless of
sex and discount rate. These results confirm findings by Turra (2004), who
showed that annuitant mortality is slightly lower than mortality of healthy
individuals in the population. This explains why the results in Table 10-2
are always less than 1. The money’s worth values are especially low for
men, overall, and for retirees with ADL limitations—between 0.65 and 0.70.
These estimates therefore imply that there would be significant adverse
selection in the private annuity market, so that the decision to purchase
a life annuity implies payouts well below the actuarially fair value, especially
for retirees in poor health.
Another important economic parameter is the amount of starting wealth
invested in a preexisting real annuity; for instance, this could include DB
pension benefits and Social Security payments. The larger is the starting wealth in a preexisting real annuity, the smaller will be the amount
remaining that the retiree can use to purchase the life annuity. For many
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Table 10-2 Annuity Values per Premium Dollar for a Fixed Immediate
Real Annuity Purchased at Age 65 (before tax)
Sex & Discount
Rate (%)

Health at the Age of Annuity Purchase
No Functioning
Problems

IADL
Limitations

ADL
Limitations

0.89
0.91
0.92

0.76
0.79
0.81

0.60
0.63
0.66

0.97
0.98
0.98

0.88
0.90
0.91

0.69
0.71
0.74

Men
3
5
7
Women
3
5
7
Source: Authors’ calculations.

Notes: Each entry shows the expected present discounted value of the annuity payouts
per dollar of annuity premium. All calculations assume premium costs calculated
based on the Annuitant Mortality Life Table (SOA 1999); no loads as per Mitchell
et al. (1999).

simulations, we assume that half of initial wealth is held in a preexisting
real annuity, a stylized description of the Social Security system (Mitchell
and Moore 1998; Moore and Mitchell 2000). For sensitivity analyses, we
also assume that the preexisting real annuity is either 25 or 75 percent of
total retirement wealth.
Our empirical approach handles out-of-pocket medical expenses as a
percent of the retiree’s preexisting real annuity (pension or Social Security
income), for two reasons. First, using relative rather than dollar values for
out-of-pocket medical expenses avoids having to estimate dollar values for
other model parameters, that is, all values are given in relative terms (e.g.,
relative to W0 = 100). Second, by making medical expenses a function of
retirement income, this implicitly assumes that the amount that the elderly
spend on health care depends on income levels, which is a reasonable way
to represent the distribution of health-care costs by socioeconomic group.
Estimating out-of-pocket medical expenses requires calculating: (a) the
distribution of health status at each age, (b) the value of medical expenses
(as a proportion of Social Security income), and (c ) the probabilities of
incurring medical expenses by age and health. To derive the distribution
of health status by age, we use the multistate life table model discussed
above to calculate the probability of being in each health state by age,
conditional on the health state at the age of annuity purchase (assumed
to be 65). Figure 10-1 summarizes the results for men, and the graphs show
the distribution of health status by age among male survivors, given their
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Figure 10-1. Distribution of health status by age, conditional on health status at
the age of 65, men: no functioning problems at the age of 65. (A) No functioning
problems at the age of 65. (B) IADL limitations at the age of 65. (C) ADL limitations
at the age of 65. Source: Authors’ calculations using the Health and Retirement
Study.
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Figure 10-1. (Continued)

Au: Please
provide the
expanded
form of
‘RAND’.

functional status at age 65. As expected, the distributions of health states
are very different at early ages, but they become more similar at very old
ages, as health deteriorates for all people regardless of their initial state of
heath.9
Next, we calculate the value of out-of-pocket medical expenses as a proportion of Social Security income. Here we rely on estimates provided by
RAND10 based on data from the HRS for the years 1998 and 2000. In the
data-set, out-of-pocket medical expenses include expenditures not covered
by health insurance in services such as hospital stays, nursing home stays,
doctor visits, prescription drugs, dental care, home health care, outpatient
surgery, and other services. In addition, we include total costs of premium
for health insurance coverage.11 For each respondent aged 65+, we calculate the ratio of out-of-pocket medical expenses to Social Security income.
For purposes of analytical tractability, we then create a discrete distribution
of the ratios by dividing them into 11 categories of expenses, anchored
at 0 and ranging to ≥300 percent of Social Security income. Table 10-3
summarizes the distribution of observations in each of these categories, in
the year 2000. As is clear, most of the individuals who incurred out-of-pocket
expenses spent less than 25 percent of their annual Social Security income.
Nevertheless, about 5.5 percent of the elderly above age 65 did devote more
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Table 10-3 Distribution of Out-of-Pocket Medical
Expenses (as a proportion of social
security income)
Categories (% of
social security income)
0
0–25
25–50
50–75
75–100
100–125
125–150
150–175
175–200
200–300
300+

Median Value ($)

Frequency (%)

0
11.79
43.53
68.58
96.04
122.25
139.19
168.02
194.13
268.32
489.34

20.12
48.87
16.20
6.52
2.76
1.48
0.92
0.64
0.44
0.81
1.25

Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using
HRS 2000.

than 100 percent of their Social Security income to out-of-pocket medical
expenses.
To calculate the probability of incurring out-pocket-medical expenses in
each category, we use a multinomial Logit model which controls for health
status two years earlier, age, and sex. Table 10-4 presents the results from
fitting the model for five categories of medical expenses.12 The estimated
coefficients give the partial effects of the explanatory variables on the
log-odds of being in each category of medical expenses relative to the
lowest category (of 0–25 percent of Social Security income). A positive
coefficient indicates that the explanatory variable increases the probability
of being in each category relative to the comparison category. It is apparent
from Table 10-4 that the probability of incurring medical expenditures is
significantly higher for women and persons in poor health status. The
partial effects further indicate that age is significantly associated with the
probability of incurring the highest category of medical costs (300+ percent
of Social Security income).
These probabilities of incurring out-of-pocket medical expenses are combined with the distributions of health status by age as described before, to
compute the probability of each possible consumption path by age and
health. Finally, to represent the value of out-of-pocket medical expenses
and health, we use the median ratio in each category of out-of-pocket
medical expenses (see Table 10-3).
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Table 10-4 Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results of the Probability of
Incurring Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses Between 1998 and 2000,
Age 65+
Condition in
1998

Log
(L2/L1)

Log
(L4/L1)

Log
(L6/L1)

Constant

−2.024∗∗
(0.335)
0.005
(0.004)
0.272∗∗
(0.061)

−4.414 ∗∗
(0.730)
0.002
(0.010)
0.644 ∗∗
(0.145)

−4.556∗∗
(1.279)
−0.016
(0.017)
0.835∗∗
(0.256)

0.251∗∗
(0.065)
0.239∗∗
(0.089)

0.391∗
(0.154)
0.935 ∗∗
(0.174)

0.441
(0.256)
0.845∗∗
(0.301)

Age
Female
Health status
No functioning
problems (omitted)
IADL limitations
ADL limitations

Log
(L8/L1)

Log
(L10/L1)

−8.656 ∗∗ −10.938∗∗
(1.905)
(1.079)
0.046
0.073∗
(0.025)
(0.013)
−0.030
0.455∗∗
(0.372)
(0.229)

−0.015
(0.461)
1.010∗
(0.446)

0.932∗∗
(0.288)
1.736∗∗
(0.291)

Log-likelihood =
−13,110
Sample size = 9,038
Source: Authors’ calculations from HRS (1998, 2000).
Notes: Categories of Medical Expenses computed as % of Social Security Income: L1 = 0–
25%, L2 = 25–50%, L4 = 75–100%, L6 = 125–150%, L8 = 175–200%, L10 = 300+%. Standard
errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01.

Empirical Findings
As is standard in economic models of annuity valuation, we present both
the optimal annuitization level generated by the model and also the AEW
for a variety of cases. The AEW refers to the amount of additional wealth
that the retiree would require, if he did not have access to an annuity
market, to achieve the lifetime utility level that he could achieve with access
to an annuity market.
First we compute the AEW for people who face no uncertain medical
expenses. For each state of health, we provide the optimal choices under
uniform pricing and actuarially fair risk pricing. We assume a preexisting
real annuity worth 50 percent of initial wealth, and three alternative
degrees of risk aversion. Focusing for discussion purposes on a risk-aversion
level of three, it appears that there are utility gains from purchasing a
nominal annuity; see Table 10-5. This is consistent with previous empirical analyses (e.g., Mitchell et al. 1999; Brown 2003). Full annuitization
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Women
No functioning problems
Actuarially fair premium
Uniform pricing
IADL limitations
Actuarially fair premium
Uniform pricing
ADL limitations
Actuarially fair premium
Uniform pricing
Men
No functioning problems
Actuarially fair premium
Uniform pricing
IADL limitations
Actuarially fair premium
Uniform pricing
ADL limitations
Actuarially fair premium
Uniform pricing

Annuity
Equivalent
Wealth

CRRA = 1

Table 10-5 Annuity Equivalent Value and Optimal Annuitization, Model 1, Fixed Nominal Annuity (inflation = 3.2%)
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is the optimal solution even when retirees lack access to an actuarially
fair contract. Yet there is a much larger dispersion in the AEW values
across population subgroups, as compared to earlier studies. Our figures
vary between 1.17 and 1.85, and they depend heavily on the interaction
between health status and annuity pricing. In the case of women with
ADL limitations, for example, the AEW falls from 1.85 when annuities
are actuarially fair to only 1.17 under uniform pricing. In other words,
adverse selection in annuities appears to impose high opportunity costs
for people in poor health, and it also reduces considerably the insurance value of a nominal annuity. The effects of adverse selection are also
strong at the lower-risk-aversion level of one. In this case, the results in
Table 10-5 show that women with ADL limitations and men with IADL
or ADL limitations will choose partial annuitization. For example, men
with ADL limitations will invest only half of available wealth in private
annuities. Not surprisingly, the insurance value of annuities also falls considerably: AEW is 1.02 and 1.04, respectively, for men and women with ADL
limitations.
Table 10-6 assumes that annuities provide consumers with a constant
real payout stream; these results continue to ignore uncertain medical
expenses. Compared to previous findings in the nominal annuity case, the
actuarial pricing results indicate a slight increase in the utility gains from
purchasing a real annuity. This pattern holds for people in good health,
as well as for people in poor health with access to actuarially fair annuity
premiums. Under uniform pricing, however, the opposite results obtain.
Both men and women with ADL limitations would be worse off if they
purchased a real rather than a fixed nominal annuity. This result is due
to the fact that these individuals have a low probability of surviving to the
oldest ages. Since a fixed nominal annuity offers higher real payouts early
on, as compared to a real annuity, the utility gains for the less healthy are
higher in the first case. These findings suggest that insurers can mitigate
the effects of adverse selection for people in poor health, and increase
the demand for private annuities, by providing annuities that offer higher
payments in earlier years of the contracts.
We now shift attention to the results of our extended model to show
how desired annuitization and AEW values change when people face
both uncertain survival and uncertain out-of-pocket medical expenses.
Table 10-7 reports the figures for each state of health and three values of
preexisting real annuity: 25, 50, and 75 percent of wealth. We focus on
the case of a fixed nominal annuity under uniform pricing, and a riskaversion level of three. Here we see that both optimal annuitization and
utility gains from purchasing a nominal annuity are lower when people face
out-of-pocket medical expenses. In the case of a preexisting real annuity
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No functioning problems
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No functioning problems
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Table 10-6 Annuity Equivalent Value and Optimal Annuitization: Model 1, Real Annuity
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Table 10-7 Annuity Equivalent Value and Optimal Annuitization Under Uniform Pricing and Uncertain Survival: With and
Without Out-of-Pocket (OOP) Medical Costs and Fixed Nominal Annuity
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worth 50 percent of wealth, we find that people would forgo less of their
wealth to purchase a nominal annuity. When uncertain medical expenses
are accounted for, the AEW values fall from 1.17 to 1.04 for men with ADL
limitations, and from 1.27 to 1.19 for men with no functioning problems.
Similar results are observed for women. These results suggest that AEW is
overstated 5–11 percent ignoring out-of-pocket medical expenses. Not surprisingly, the largest differences are for people with functional limitations,
since they have the highest probability of remaining in poor health and
therefore have the highest risk of incurring out-of-pocket medical expenses
over the life cycle.
The effect of uncertain out-of-pocket medical expenses is more evident
when we compare optimal levels of annuitization. Previous studies have
indicated that people in poor health rarely annuitize (Brown 2001b; Johnson, Burman, and Kobes 2004). Indeed, our findings rationalize this empirical evidence, since because of precautionary motives, full annuitization is
unlikely to be an optimal solution. In contrast to earlier studies and our
simpler model, we now predict that all retirees, regardless of health status,
will only partially annuitize at age 65. As expected, those in poorest health
would be expected to convert the smallest amount of their wealth into
an annuity. Table 10-6 shows that among men with ADL limitations, the
optimal annuitization of additional wealth (conditional on Social Security
being half of total wealth) is 19 percent, while among women in the same
health status, the figure is 27 percent.
Finally, it is of interest to explore sensitivity analysis for other parameters.
Increasing the levels of Social Security and DB pensions to 75 percent of
wealth further reduces the optimal levels of annuitization and AEW values. Two factors explain this additional reduction. First, when more initial
wealth is held as a preexisting real annuity, the insurance value of additional annuitization is reduced. Second, as discussed earlier, out-of-pocket
medical expenses are measured as a proportion of Social Security benefits.
Therefore, increasing the value of preexisting real annuity automatically
increases the nominal value of out-of-pocket medical expenses, and therefore it produces more precautionary savings in our model. Although this
is only one way to formulate the problem, it is illustrative in showing that
private annuities can become worthless for people in poor health who are
overannuitized and face the risk of incurring large out-of-pocket medical
expenses.

Discussion and Conclusions
In this analysis, we have examined how retirees’ health status may influence
their decisions to purchase payout life annuities. Our main contribution
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is to show that the insurance value of a life annuity may be smaller than
that reported in prior studies. The findings suggest that differences in
health and anticipated health-care expenses can help explain why many
people do not fully annuitize at retirement. While prior research suggested
that an average person would forgo about 40 percent of his wealth to
purchase a life annuity (Mitchell et al. 1999), our work indicates that this
may not hold for the majority of the population. For someone with health
problems, a life annuity priced using annuitant mortality rates implies
expected payouts well below the actuarially fair value for that retiree. We
provide evidence that adverse selection in annuities reduces the annuity
equivalent wealth from values greater than 1.5, to values close to 1.17 for
people in poor health, and 1.28 for people in good health. Prior studies
have also ignored precautionary savings motivated by uncertain out-ofpocket medical expenses. Our stylized life cycle model with uncertain outof-pocket medical expenses shows that annuities become less attractive to
people facing such medical expenses. Thus, regardless of health status and
medical shocks, full annuitization would still be optimal, if annuity markets
were truly complete and were both life and health contingent (Davidoff,
Brown, and Diamond 2005). Nevertheless, when both adverse selection
and uncertain medical expenses are accounted for and annuity markets
are incomplete, we show that annuity equivalent wealth values are fairly low
for people in poor health, and about 25 percent higher for people in good
health.
Some implications of our analysis are worth noting. First, earlier investigations have used annuity equivalent wealth measures as explanatory
variables in models predicting retirees’ probability of annuitizing (Brown
2001b; Petrova 2003). Although such models control for health status
(Brown 2001b), our study indicates that they should also account directly
for health differentials in the AEW measures. Second, our results also
imply that offering higher payouts for consumers in case of a medical
shock could make annuities more attractive for many, and perhaps even
most, of the retiring population. Future research should evaluate how
insurers might fashion annuity contracts that better fit the needs of the
older, perhaps unhealthy, population. Finally, our model predicts that most
retirees would be made worse off by requiring full annuitization, if uniform
pricing were involved. These results are important in the context of Social
Security reforms proposing personal retirement accounts with mandatory
annuitization. Indeed, mandatory annuitization should integrate risk classification providing actuarially fair annuities to people in different health
states.
Future research can extend our work by taking into account additional
heterogeneity between people in different health states. In addition, it
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would be of interest to incorporate correlation between medical expenses
and future mortality as well as bequest motives.
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Notes
1

Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005) recently extended Yaari’s model and
derived conditions for optimal full annuitization in a more general setting. They
show that when markets are complete, full annuitization is optimal even if some
assumptions of Yaari’s model are relaxed, such as additively separable utility. The
value of annuities lessens if annuity markets are incomplete, but some annuitization
is still optimal as long as there is a positive premium for annuitizing wealth and
conventional markets are complete.
2
The HRS is a nationally representative study of the non-institutionalized population over age 50 and their spouses/partners (regardless of age). The HRS
data-set contains detailed data on health, financial status, retirement, and family
support. Cohorts were interviewed in different waves from 1992 to 2002 (hrsonline.isr.umich.edu).
3
This is the maximum age for which we can estimate reliable parameters based on
actual data. Using an older age for the terminal age does not affect our conclusions
since the probability of surviving beyond age 95 is low.
4
Health status and mortality in period t depend on health status in period t − 1,
and the probability of incurring medical costs is a function of health status in period
t − 1. For this reason, part of the correlation between medical expenses and health
status or survival in period t is indirectly accounted for in our model. Future work
will explore alternative formulations.
5
Previous studies have suggested that risk aversion may vary across population
subgroups; thus Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) find that risk aversion in the HRS
increases with education and is higher among natives and non-Hispanics; also
self-reported depressed individuals have 13 percent lower risk aversion than the
average individual. In future research we will evaluate the sensitivity of results to the
hypothesis that people in poor health have lower risk aversion than those in good
health.
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6
IADLs refer to Instrumental Activities of Daily Living which include difficulties
in performing at least one of the following activities: managing the money, making
phone calls, preparing a hot meal, and shopping for groceries.
7
ADLs refer to Activities of Daily Living which include difficulties in performing at
least one of the following activities: bathing/showering, dressing, eating and using
the toilet, and getting in and out of bed.
8
An actuarially fair premium is one in which the premium equals the present
discounted value of expected annuity payments.
9
In general, results for women are similar, although the proportion of female
survivors with functional limitations is higher than that of men (results available
upon request).
10
We use the 2004 RAND SSA-HRS datafile (www.rand.org/labor/aging/
dataprod/#randhrs).
11
Total premiums includes premiums for employer-provided health insurance,
private health insurance, long-term care insurance, Medicare through a Health
Maintenance Organization, and Medigap.
12
We present only results for five categories for clarity; results for the omitted
categories are consistent with those presented in Table 10-4.
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